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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most fundamental social interests is that law shall be uniform and
impartial. There must be nothing in its action that savors of prejudice or favor or even
arbitrary whim or fitfulness.1
A suspect is charged with a federal crime, obtains legal coun-
sel, and finds out who his judge will be. Because of a prominent rumor
circulating in the community that the defendant once had an affair
with the judge's wife,2 the defendant questions the judge's ability to be
fair with him. He and his counsel file a timely motion for recusal un-
1. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112 (1921).
2. These hypothetical facts are loosely borrowed from an actual case. See United States v.
Brinkworth, 68 F.3d 633, 635 (2d Cir. 1995) and infra discussion Part IV.B.2. Under 28 U.S.C. §
455(a), the reasons for moving for the judge's disqualification must, of course, have a reasonable
basis. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1994); see also H.R. REP. No. 93-1453, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6355 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT] ("Disqualification for lack of impartiality
must have a reasonable basis."). Specific grounds for recusal are also listed in 28 U.S.C. § 455(b).
3. Circuits are split as to whether there is a timeliness requirement to § 455(a). In some
jurisdictions, failure to present a timely motion for recusal is fatal to the defendant's case. See,
e.g., Brinkworth, 68 F.3d at 639 (citing Apple v. Jewish Hosp., 829 F.2d 326, 333 (2d Cir. 1987)).
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der 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).' The judge promptly denies the motion with
little to no comment. Discouraged, and now worried, the defendant
considers plea bargaining. The prosecutor, who knows about the ru-
mor, proposes a bargain that includes a recommendation to the judge
of a lightened sentence in exchange for the defendant's unconditional
guilty plea. The defendant and his counsel repeatedly try bargaining
to condition the plea on being able to appeal the denied motion to re-
cuse, but the prosecutor steadfastly refuses: "It's all or nothin'. Take
this deal, or take your chances with the judge at trial." The defendant
reluctantly signs the plea. The prosecutor and defense counsel inform
the judge of the plea agreement,5 and the judge sets a date for sen-
tencing. At sentencing, the judge acknowledges the prosecutor's light-
ened sentence suggestion, but decides that this defendant deserves a
harsher sentence. Irate and feeling that the judge has been biased
against him, the defendant tries to appeal the denial of the recusal
motion.'
A split currently exists in the United States Courts of Appeals
as to whether this criminal defendant will be able to appeal the
judge's denial of his motion to recuse. In 1988, the Tenth Circuit first
decided the issue in United States v. Gipson.' In Gipson, the court held
that only a charge of actual bias8 would survive a guilty plea Two
In other jurisdictions, no strict timeliness requirement applies to § 455(a). See, e.g., United
States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 747 (11th Cir. 1989). For further discussion, see infra Part II.D.2.
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1994). Congress wrote this section to be self-executing, i.e., the
judge would recuse himself. See Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d 155, 162 (3d Cir.
1993) (requiring judge to recuse himself sua sponte under § 455 whenever impartiality might
reasonbly be questioned). However, parties may also make a motion to recuse. See 28 U.S.C. §
455; see also Michele Dickey, Authority of the Trial Judge, in Twenty-Seventh Annual Review of
Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1659, 1662 (1998).
5. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
6. A harsh sentence is not the only reason criminal defendants might seek appeal of the
denial of recusal motion, although it seems the most likely reason. By itself, a stiff sentence is
not grounds for reversal. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1). Being innocent of the charges is another
obvious reason a defendant might want to appeal the motion.
Some might argue that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines alleviate any concern regarding
the harshness of sentences. That is simply not the case. Prosecutors still have many options in
charging and in plea bargaining which can put them more in control of sentencing than judges
are. See United States v. Harrington, 947 F.2d 956, 964 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Edwards, J.,
concurring) ("Assistant U.S. Attorneys ("AUSAs') have been heard to say, with open candor, that
there are many 'games to be played,' both in charging defendants and in plea bargaining, to
circumvent the Guidelines.').
7. United States v. Gipson, 835 F.2d 1323, 1325 (10th Cir. 1988).
8. Section 455(b) deals with issues of actual bias. Section 455(a) deals only with the
appearance of impartiality. The statute reads:
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
2000] 985
986 VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW [Vol. 53:983
years later, the First Circuit came out the other way in United States
v. Chantal, holding that Chantal's § 455(a) challenge to the trial
judge's qualification was not waived by his guilty plea." Circuits
addressing the issue since these two decisions have aligned
themselves with one of the two sides." The First and Second Circuits
allow a criminal defendant to appeal the denied recusal motion
following an unconditional guilty plea-the Fifth, Seventh and Tenth
Circuits do not.
This Note argues that criminal defendants who have entered
unconditional guilty pleas following a denial of a motion to recuse un-
der § 455(a) should be able to appeal the recusal decision even without
reserving the right to appeal it in their guilty pleas." Part II of this
Note discusses the history and purpose behind 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), and
how the appearance of judicial impartiality is a necessary element for
the effective functioning of the judicial system. Part III explores plea
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(2) Where in private practice he served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy,
or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served as a lawyer in the matter,
or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity
participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or
expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy;
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child
residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in
controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;,
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either
of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party;,
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;,
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially
affected by the outcome of the proceeding;,
(iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the
proceeding.
28 U.S.C. §§ 455(a), (b) (1994). In the context of requesting the judge's disqualification, then,
the Gipson court held that appearance of impartiality would not survive a guilty plea, but actual
bias would (e.g., a § 455(b) infraction). See Gipson, 835 F.2d at 1325. Other issues that would
withstand a guilty plea are jurisdictional issues, such as failure of the indictment to charge an
offense, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, double jeopardy, etc. See Christine M. Guidubaldi &
Steve Kim, Guilty Pleas, 86 GEO. L.J. 1510, 1522-23 (1998); see also note 4
9. See Gipson, 835 F.2d at 1325.
10. United States v. Chantal, 902 F.2d 1018, 1020 (1st Cir. 1990).
11. The Seventh Circuit aligned itself with the Gipson decision in United States v. Troxell,
887 F.2d 830, 833 (7th Cir. 1989), as did the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Hoctel, 154 F.3d
506, 508 (5th Cir. 1998). The Second Circuit aligned itself with the Chantal decision in United
States v. Brinkworth, 68 F.3d 633, 638 (2d Cir. 1995); however, the defendant did not prevail
because his motion was not timely. See id. at 639. As of the publication of this Note, other
circuits have not yet addressed the issue.
12. For a discussion of unconditional guilty pleas, see infra Part III.B.1.
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bargaining in our criminal justice system, and the judge's crucial role
in guaranteeing the voluntariness of guilty pleas. Part IV describes
how the five circuit courts addressing the issue so far have resolved
the question of whether a criminal defendant may appeal a denied
recusal motion after entering an unconditional guilty plea. Part V ar-
gues that because of the importance of public confidence in the impar-
tiality of the criminal justice system, the importance of ensuring that
criminal defendants' guilty pleas are truly voluntary, and the improb-
ability of prosecutorial and judicial consent to a guilty plea condi-
tioned on reserving the right to appeal the denial of the recusal mo-
tion, federal courts should recognize that an unconditional guilty plea
is not a per se waiver of the defendant's right to disqualify the judge
when his" impartiality is reasonably in question.
II. A LOOKAT JuDIcIAL RECUSAL
A. Construing Recusal with Reference to the Values it Protects
An impartial judiciary is essential to the proper functioning of
our judicial system. Two purposes are served by the requirement that
judges be impartial: protecting the procedural due process rights of
defendants,' and maintaining public confidence in the integrity of the
judicial system." It is a general rule that the appearance of partiality
13. The vast majority of federal court judges are male, see Judith Resnik, "Naturally"
Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682, 1705
(1991), as are federal criminal defendants, see U.S. DEPT. JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES
225 (1996) (finding that, in 1995, males accounted for approximately 80% of all arrestees).
Throughout this Note, the male pronoun will be used to refer to both criminal defendants and
judges for ease of reference.
14. The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments entitle defendants to
a "neutral and detached judge." Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972); see
also Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523, 532-35
(1927); In re Parr, 13 B.R. 1010, 1019 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (stating that the Fifth Amendment bars
trials where "appearance of justice is not satisfied). A colorable argument also exists that the
Sixth Amendment's language ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a... trial, by an impartial jury') could be interpreted to require an impartial adjudicator,
thereby also requiring a judge, in the absence of a jury, to be impartial. See U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
15. See Amy J. Shimek, Professional Responsibility Survey: Recusal, 73 DENV. U. L. REV.
903, 917 (1996); Lawrence J. Hand, Jr., Casenote, Liteky v. United States: Jeopardizing Judicial
Integrity, 40 LOY. L. REV. 995, 996-97 (1995) (citing 13A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3541, at 548-49 (1984)); Susan B. Hoekema, Comment, Questioning
the Impartiality of Judges: Disqualifying Federal District Court Judges Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a),
60 TEMP. L.Q. 697, 705 (1987).
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is as damaging to public confidence as its actual existence. 6 Court
authority is grounded on confidence in the judiciary, which in turn is
grounded in the belief that specific judicial decisions remain uninflu-
enced by the personal biases or interests of the judge." Without this
necessary degree of reverence,18 the judicial system would cease to
function effectively. 9
1. Public Confidence in the Judicial System
The federal judiciary relies, for purposes of enforcement of its
decisions, on the continued public belief in the legitimacy and neu-
trality of the judicial process. As Judge William Bodoh said, 'The judi-
ciary does not have an army to enforce its decisions and orders....
Throughout the history of our nation, courts have relied upon the un-
derlying confidence of the public in the fairness and impartiality of the
judicial system to obey court orders without being coerced."' In order
to safeguard public confidence, some mechanism must ensure the im-
partiality of judges. Congress placed the responsibility of'policing im-
partiality squarely on the shoulders of federal judges through the self-
enforcement of recusal statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 455," as well as the duty
to rule on litigants' motions for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 144.'
This policing responsibility is especially important in the fed-
eral court system. In state courts, the judges are usually accountable
to the electorate and can be ousted if the public distrusts their objec-
16. See United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869, 881 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Potashnick v.
Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350
(9th Cir. 1978)); see also Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86
HARV. L. REv. 736, 745 (1973). '
17. See Conforte, 624 F.2d at 881 (citing Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the
Federal Courts, supra note 16, at 747).
18. Professor David Blanck has called for empirical research on the "appearance of justice"
in the judicial system in general, and the criminal justice system specifically. In his article, The
Appearance of Justice Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 887, 888 (1996), Professor Blanck
quotes Judge Cordell's opening remarks at the "Appearance of Justice" Conference at Princeton
University on November 11, 1995: "[But] when we talk about the [current] social norms and the
appearance of justice, we have got young [black) men-and Latino males--coming into a system
that doesn't appear fair to them.... There's got to be different approaches taken." His article
focuses on the societal need for a criminal justice system that is, and appears to be, above
reproach, and suggests that the legal community should search out ways to remedy any flaws.
Professor Blanck also quotes the words delivered by Professor Paul Robinson at the Conference:
"Ne need to have a criminal justice system which speaks with moral authority, which means it
has to have the appearance of fairness.... That's one part of making law more powerful-by
increasing its appearance of doing justice." Id. at 926.
19. See generally text accompanying supra note 17.
20. William T. Bodoh, On Judging Judges, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 889, 890 (1994).
21. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1994).
22. See id. § 144.
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tivity." Federal judges, on the other hand, are appointed for life ten-
ure,2 4 and therefore are quite immune to voters' whims.' The only
meaningful checks on their power short of impeachment are: (1) insti-
tutional obeisance to the dictates of the legislature; and, (2) self-im-
posed ethical obligations, both of which embody self-enforcing mecha-
nisms to ensure the integrity of the judiciary.' Recusal statutes
therefore are powerful enforcement mechanisms to check the power of
the judiciary.
2. Individual Rights of Litigants
Although somewhat secondary to the need for public confidence
in judicial integrity, due process rights of litigants are certainly an
important concern behind recusal in general."1 If courts started ignor-
ing the procedural rights of litigants, confidence in the judicial process
would plummet. In this sense, these two concerns are inseparably
linked. But courts have held that depriving a defendant of his right to
an impartial judge is, in and of itself, sufficient grounds for reversal.'
B. The Evolution of Federal Recusal Statutes in the United States
Early in the nation's history, Congress recognized the critical
need for an impartial federal judiciary. The first federal recusal stat-
ute, enacted in 1792, required judges to disqualify themselves from
cases in which they had an improper interest or had been counsel to a
23. See DANIEL R. GRANT & H.C. NIXON, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 397
(2d ed. 1968) (discussing the political roles played by judges); see also MARVIN COMISKY & PHILIP
C. PATTERSON, THE JUDICIARY: SELECTION, COMPENSATION, ETHICS, AND DISCIPLINE 2-18 (1987)
(detailing the methods for judicial selection/election/retention in the states).
24. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
25, See Jonathan R. Macey, Originalism as an "Ism," 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 301, 307
(1996) (noting that the supposed independence of federal judges from political influence is one of
the arguments in favor of judicial review).
26. Cf. Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 653-80 (1993)
(arguing that the federal judiciary is more majoritarian than countermajoritarian, and is subject
to meaningful checks on its power).
27. See supra note 14; see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 6355 ("Litigants ought not
have to face a judge where there is a reasonable question of impartiality.'). The secondary
nature of the concern for an individual litigant's procedural rights is evidenced by the number of
times "public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process" is stated as the main purpose
behind the 1974 amendments (at least 4 times in the House Report alone). Id. at 6351-57.
28. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532-35 (1927) ("Every procedure which would offer a
possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to
convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true
between the state and the accused, denies the latter due process of law.'); see also Liljeberg v.
Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 867-68 (1988) (vacatur will be available for
infractions of§ 455(a) if, inter alia, fairness to the particular litigants requires it).
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party.' An 1821 statute broadened the bases of disqualification to
cover any relationship the judge had with a party that would render
his continuing as judge improper, but left it within the judge's discre-
tion as to whether or not he should sit."
In 1911, Congress enacted a statute, now codified as 28 U.S.C.
§ 144, that establishes a procedural method for litigants to disqualify
judges on the basis of "personal bias or prejudice."'" The procedural
requirements include a "timely" and "sufficient" affidavit, setting forth
the reasons supporting the alleged bias or prejudice." Courts have
interpreted the words "'personal bias or prejudice"" to mean that the
source of the bias may not originate in judicial proceedings. 4 Because
courts have demanded strict adherence to § 144's procedural require-
ments,"5 however, commentators have suggested that it is not as effi-
cacious for disqualifying a judge with a bias as Congress originally
intended."
29. See Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 278, cited in Liteky v. United States, 510
U.S. 540, 544 (1994).
30. See Act of Mar. 3, 1821, ch. 51, 3 Stat. 643, cited in Liteky, 510 U.S. at 544; see also
Jeremy S. Brumbelow, Case Note, Liteky v. United States: The Extrajudicial Source Doctrine
and Its Implications for Judicial Disqualification, 48 ARK. L. REV. 1059, 1066 (1995) ("In 1821,
Congress expanded the recusal statute to cover any judicial relationship or connection with a
party that, in the judge's opinion, would make it improper to sit.').
In 1891, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 47, which prohibits a federal judge from hearing an
appeal from a case he decided as a trial judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 47 (1994). This statutory
requirement cannot be waived or avoided by the parties. See Rexford v. Brunswick-Balke-
Collender Co., 228 U.S. 339, 344 (1913).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1994).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See generally discussion infra Part II.D.3 (regarding the extrajudicial source limitation).
35. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 34 (1921) (affidavit must state supporting
factual grounds with particularity); Davis v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 734 F.2d 1302,
1303 (8th Cir. 1984) (conclusory allegations of bias or prejudice are legally and factually
insufficient); Roberts v. Bailar, 625 F.2d 125, 128 (6th Cir. 1980) (affidavit must be sworn to or
affirmed by party, not counsel; otherwise "invalid'); Morrison v. United States, 432 F.2d 1227,
1229 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (counsel must certify that affidavit is filed in good faith; such
certificate must be filed with the affidavit); United States v. Thomas, 299 F. Supp. 494, 498-500
(E.D. Mo. 1968) (litigants must be in strict compliance with procedural requirements, or will not
benefit from protections).
36. See 13A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 3542, at 555; see also Brumbelow, supra note
30, at 1069-70; see generally David C. Hjelmfelt, Statutory Disqualification of Federal Judges, 30
U. KAN. L. REV. 255 (1982); Bernard Schwartz, Disqualification for Bias in the Federal District
Court, 11 U. PITT. L. REV. 415 (1950). Apparently there is some evidence in the legislative
history that Congress meant for recusal under § 144 to be automatic, and judges were not to pass
on the sufficiency of the affidavit. See Mark T. Coberly, Comment, Caesar's Wife Revisited-
Judicial Disqualification After the 1974 Amendments, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1201, 1216 (1977)
(noting that several commentators are dissatisfied with the current recusal procedures and
advocate an automatic disqualification scheme).
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To supplement a litigant's ability to get a judge to recuse him-
self with a requirement that a judge act affirmatively to recuse him-
self, Congress enacted the forerunner of the current 28 U.S.C. § 455 in
1948."7 In its original form, § 455 called for a federal judge's disqualifi-
cation in situations where the judge, "in his opinion," thought it im-
proper for him to sit." Although technically self-enforcing,39 because
the judge had discretion regarding what was improper, the statute
lacked meaningful enforcement mechanisms. Courts quickly articu-
lated a "duty to sit!' doctrine that required judges "faced with a close
question on disqualification" to resolve the issue in favor of not dis-
qualifying themselves.0
Recusal statutes thus evolved until the American Bar Associa-
tion adopted the Model Code of Judicial Conduct4' in 1972.2 Canon 3C
of the 1972 Code greatly enlarged the previous bases for judicial dis-
qualification. 43 Two short years later, in an effort to harmonize the
divergent requirements of the recusal statutes and the ABA's Canons,
Congress voiced its approval of the ABA Code when it amended 28
U.S.C. § 455 to adopt the Code's provisions." In so doing, Congress
separated what would become known as the "appearance of bias" test
from the enumerated grounds for disqualification into two statutory
provisions. In 28 U.S.C. § 455(b), Congress listed the bases that would
require disqualification, and set § 455(a) up as a "catch-all" provision.
In other words, § 455(a) and (b) together represent all the situations
where a judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned:
subsection (b) lists those that the drafters could think of, subsection
(a) stands in for those they could not. '
37. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 455, 62 Stat. 869, 908 (amended by Act of Dec. 5,
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-512, 88 Stat. 1609, 1609 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1994))).
38. Id.; see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 6354-55.
39. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970).
40. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 6354-55; see also Christopher R. Carton, Comment,
Disqualifying Federal Judges for Bias, A Consideration of the Extrajudicial Bias Limitation for
Disqualification Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 2057, 2067 (1994) (noting that
the self-enforcement provision was largely superfluous).
41. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C (1972). The current version is Canon 3E
(2000).
42. See CoMIsKy & PATTERSON, supra note 23, at 68-69 (discussing the historical
development of the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct).
43. See id. For a good discussion of the relevant differences between the old Canons of
Judicial Ethics and the new Model Code of Judicial Conduct, see HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at
6352-53.
44. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 6353-55.
45. See id. at 6354.
46. See id.; see also, e.g., United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869, 880-81 (9th Cir. 1980).
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C. Recusal Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)
Upon the enactment of § 455(a), the statutory concept of ap-
pearance of bias first appeared. 7 The stated purpose of the appearance
of bias provision was to "enhance public confidence in the impartiality
of the judicial system."48 The legislative history of § 455(a) mentions
the rights of litigants, but its primary focus is on promoting public
confidence in the integrity of the judicial process. 9 The two are insepa-
rably linked: "[t]he public's confidence in the judiciary... may be
irreparably harmed if a case is allowed to proceed before a judge who
appears to be tainted."'
In codifying the ABA's appearance of bias concept, Congress in-
corporated small but important alterations into the language of the
statute. Rather than using the ABA's permissive language ("should")5'
regarding whether disqualification was called for, Congress chose to
mandate disqualification by using a more restrictive word choice
("shall").2 Also, rather than combining the appearance of bias lan-
guage with the enumerated grounds for disqualification, 3 Congress
separated them, giving each its own discrete structure.' These differ-
ences evidence congressional intent to "broaden and clarify the
grounds for judicial disqualification."5
Congressional amendments to § 455 served many other pur-
poses. For instance, Congress removed the "so-called 'duty to sit"'
requirement whereby judges should not disqualify themselves in a
close call.' Furthermore, § 455 does not have the procedural baggage
attendant to its sister provision, 28 U.S.C. § 144. There are no explicit
47. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) now provides: "Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States
shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned." Canon 3C(1) read: "A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(1)
(1972). The 2000 version is Canon 3E(1), and has an important change: the "should" from the
1972 version was changed to "shall" by the Aug. 10, 1999 amendment. See ABA HOUSE OF
DELEGATES, REPORT 123.
48. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 6354.
49. See generally discussion supra Part II.A.
50. In re School Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 776 (3d Cir. 1992).
51. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(1) (1972).
52. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1994). The ABA remedied this inconsistency in 1999. See CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(1) (2000).
53. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 3C(1)(a)-(b) (1972).
54. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 455(a)-(b). See supra note 8 for full text of statute. This change may
suggest that Congress thought § (a) was not just the catchall provision for everything not
enumerated in § (b); otherwise, the structure of Canon 3C would have been sufficient. On the
other hand, it may suggest that Congress made the change to improve clarity.
55. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 6351.
56. Id. at 6355.
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timeliness requirements, affidavit requirements, etc., thus making its
operation easier." Section 455 is also addressed to judges themselves:
it is self-executing, placing the burden on judges to comply with the
statute on their initiative.58
The most remarkable change Congress accomplished through
the amendments to § 455(a) was the creation of an objective standard
for evaluating judicial impartiality. 9 The inquiry under § 455(a) is
whether a reasonable person knowing the facts and circumstances
would "harbor doubts" as to the judge's impartiality.' This test is
based on the inferences a reasonable person would make, not on the
subjective opinion of the judge,"' nor on a litigant's fear of an adverse
decision. 2 Inquiry into whether the judge is in fact impartial is irrele-
vant to the disqualification determination.'
D. Limits on the Operation of the Federal Recusal Statute
Limitations operate on § 455, including waiver, a timeliness
requirement, the extrajudicial source doctrine, and deferential appel-
late review. All of these limits can have important consequences on a
challenge to a judge's decision not to recuse himself.
1. Waiver Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(e)
Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(e), waiver of a defendant's right to have
the judge recuse himself is available for violations of § 455(a), but not
for § 455(b).' Waiver under § 455(e) does have one procedural re-
57. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 455, with 28 U.S.C. § 144.
58. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 859-61 (1988).
59. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994); Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 860-61.
60. Edelstein v. Wilentz, 812 F.2d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 1987); see also, e.g., Yagman v. Republic
Ins., 987 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Lovaglia, 954 F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir.
1992); Union Carbide Corp. v. United States Cutting Serv., Inc., 782 F.2d 710, 715 (7th Cir.
1986); United States v. Martorano, 620 F.2d 912, 919 (1st Cir. 1980).
61. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 6354-55 (removing the phrase "in his opinion" from
§ 455 to accomplish an objective standard).
62. See id. at 6355 ("Nothing in this proposed legislation should be read to warrant the
transformation of a litigant's fear that a judge may decide a question against him into a
'reasonable fear' that the judge will not be impartial.'); see also United States v. Corr, 434 F.
Supp. 408, 412-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
63. See Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 860-61 (quoting with approval the language of the appellate
court: "an appearance of partiality is created even though no actual partiality exists"); accord In
re Beard, 811 F.2d 818, 827 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Gigax, 605 F.2d 507, 511 (10th Cir.
1979); Rice v. McKenzie, 581 F.2d 1114, 1116 (4th Cir. 1978).
64. The rationale behind allowing waiver for violations of § (a) but not of § (b) is not entirely
clear. Canon 3F of the Code of Judicial Conduct contemplates a "remittal of disqualification,"
which applies to all relevant grounds for disqualification. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
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quirement: it must be "preceded by a full disclosure on the record of
the basis for disqualification."' While waiver of a § 455(a) violation is
permissible, courts have ruled that it should be exercised with the
utmost restraint and limited only to marginal cases.' Furthermore,
the legislative history behind § 455(a) explicitly calls for "a more strict
treatment of waiver."' According to Johnson v. Zerbst, a waiver must
be "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege," i.e., it must be voluntary and knowing.' In addition, the
judge must carefully examine the evidence for waiver.69
2. Timeliness Requirement
Timing can be important to judicial recusal. Because § 455(a) is
self-enforcing, a judge may decide on his own to recuse himself at any
time-indeed, the judge is required to do so even if facts casting doubt
on his impartiality come to light after a judgment has been entered."0
The case differs somewhat, however, if it is a party who first moves for
CONDUCT Canon 3F (2000). Remittal and waiver are entirely different concepts. A remittal is a
procedure whereby the judge discloses on the record the basis for his disqualification, and the
parties, independently and outside of the judge's participation, agree in writing that the judge is
no longer disqualified. See id. This procedure conceals the identity of any party who declines to
furnish a remittal, and lessens the chance that a party would feel coerced into consenting. See
id. At least one circuit court has recognized the advisability of this method. See Hardy v. United
States, 878 F.2d 94, 98 n.5 (2d Cir. 1989). For the text of § 455(a) and (b), see supra note 8.
65. 28 U.S.C. § 455(e) (1994). If there is a factual dispute concerning the facts underlying a
motion to disqualify, this must be fully developed in the record. See Barksdale v. Emerick, 853
F.2d 1359, 1362 (6th Cir. 1988). Furthermore, a waiver proffered by a party does not require the
judge to forego recusal when his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. See United States
v. Pepper & Potter, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 123, 126 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 745-46 (11th Cir. 1989). The Eleventh
Circuit recognized the clear potential for coercion when a judge advises the parties of a possible
conflict, and then asks them to indicate their approval of the judge remaining in the case. See id.
In support of its finding, the Eleventh Circuit cited In re National Union Fire Insurance Co., 839
F.2d 1226, 1231 (7th Cir. 1988) and Andros Compania Maritima, S.A. v. Marc Rich & Co., A.G.,
579 F.2d 691, 699 (2d Cir. 1978). See id. at 746. The Eleventh Circuit further opined that an
appropriate use of waiver would be when a party becomes aware of marginally questionable
circumstances, and the parties together present the judge with a joint agreement to waive
recusal. See id. at 745 & n.23.
67. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 6357.
68. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (requiring that the defendant know of the
existence of the right and voluntarily give up that right).
69. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(e); see also Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882) ("[E]very
reasonable presumption should be indulged against... waiver" of a jury trial); accord Aetna Ins.
Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937) (same); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n,
301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937) ('We do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.).
70. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 861 (1988) ("[To the
extent [§ 455(a)] can also, in proper cases, be applied retroactively, the judge... is called upon to
rectify an oversight and to take the steps necessary to maintain public confidence in the
impartiality of the judiciary.').
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the judge's recusal. Although there is no explicit timeliness require-
ment in § 455, most courts have imposed a rule to prohibit parties
from judge-shopping and strategically concealing the ethical issues to
avoid an adverse judgment.7' The general rule is that if a party knows
of circumstances that could lead a reasonable person to question the
judge's impartiality, but does not make a motion for recusal within a
reasonable time after discovering these facts, that party may forfeit
any available relief under 28 U.S.C. § 455.7"
3. The Extrajudicial Source Limitation
The source of the alleged impartiality is also important to the
disqualification analysis. Following the amendments to § 455(a), a
debate arose in the circuits as to whether the conduct 3 alleged as the
basis for the recusal motion had to originate outside of judicial pro-
ceedings." This doctrine came to be known as the extrajudicial source
doctrine, and originated in the context of 28 U.S.C. § 144 motions re-
garding disqualification for personal bias or prejudice. 5 The doctrine
requires that if the challenged judicial conduct arose in the context of
the judge's duties as judge in a case, that conduct could not serve as
the basis for recusal."6 A majority of the circuits determined that the
doctrine applied to § 455(a) as well." Commentators, however, have
71. See, e.g., Summers v. Singletary, 119 F.3d 917, 920-21 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing E. & J.
Galo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1295 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Owens,
902 F.2d 1154, 1156 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. York, 888 F.2d 1050, 1053 (5th Cir. 1989);
Willner v. University of Kan., 848 F.2d 1023, 1029 (10th Cir. 1988); Oglala Sioux Tribe v.
Homestead Mining Co., 722 F.2d 1407, 1414 (8th Cir. 1983)); see also Brumbelow, supra note 30
at 1072 n.70.
72. See generally cases listed supra note 71.
73. Conduct might include actions, comments, knowledge, or attitudes on which a party
would base its recusal motion.
74. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 546 (1994) (citing these cases for the
proposition that the extrajudicial source doctrine applies to § 455(a): United States v. Barry, 961
F.2d 260, 263 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. Sammons, 918 F.2d 592, 599 (6th Cir. 1990);
McWhorter v. Birmingham, 906 F.2d 674, 678 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Mitchell, 886
F.2d 667, 671 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 960 (5th Cir. 1986); Johnson
v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 290-91 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 869 (9th
Cir. 1980)). The Court also cited United States v. Chantal, 902 F.2d 1018, 1023-24 (1st Cir. 1990)
and United States v. Coven, 662 F.2d 162, 168-69 (2d Cir. 1981) for the proposition that the
doctrine does not apply to § 455(a).
75. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966); Berger v. United States,
255 U.S. 22, 31 (1921).
76. See cases listed supra note 74.
77. See, e.g., United States v. Prichard, 875 F.2d 789, 791 (10th Cir. 1989); In re Beard, 811
F.2d 818, 827 (4th Cir. 1987); Jaffe v. Grant, 793 F.2d 1182, 1188-89 (11th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Faul, 748 F.2d 1204, 1211 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 869 (9th
Cir. 1980); City of Cleveland v. Krupansky, 619 F.2d 576, 578 (6th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); In re
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almost uniformly argued that considering the differences in the statu-
tory language, the differing postures of the two statutes,78 as well as
congressional intent, the extrajudicial source doctrine has no legiti-
macy in the § 455(a) context."
In 1994, the Supreme Court decided Liteky v. United States,
confirming that § 455(a) was subject to the extrajudicial source limita-
tion.' While declining to hold that this limitation amounted to a per se
rule, the Liteky Court recognized that the absence of an extrajudicial
source would often be determinative in the recusal determination."
The Court did, however, leave open a small avenue of opportunity by
recognizing the possibility of a "pervasiveness" exception to the ex-
trajudicial source limitation. Under this exception, if a party could
prove that a judge's bias, although from an intrajudicial source, is "so
extreme as to display clear inability to render fair judgment,"' or "dis-
play[s] a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair
judgment impossible,"' then recusal would still be mandated by §
455(a). Clearly the Liteky decision greatly narrowed the intended
scope of § 455(a), thereby frustrating congressional policy choices, and
potentially endangering public confidence in the integrity of the judi-
cial system.'
IBM, 618 F.2d 923, 927 (2d Cir. 1980); Mayberry v. Maroney, 558 F.2d 1159, 1162 n.16 (3d Cir.
1977); United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 134 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Davis v. Board of Sch.
Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1052 (5th Cir. 1975). But see Chantal, 902 F.2d at 1023-24; Coven, 662
F.2d at 168.
78. See generally discussion supra Part 1.C.
79. See Seth E. Bloom, Judicial Bias and Financial Interest as Grounds for Disqualification
of Federal Judges, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 662, 676 (1985); Hoekema, supra note 15, at 717; see
also Brumbelow, supra note 30, at 1090-92 (attacking Liteky majority's analysis); Toni-Ann
Citera, A Look at the Extrajudicial Source Doctrine Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), 85 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1114, 1127 (1995); Hand, Jr., supra note 16, at 1009-10 (stating that
"interpretation of § 455(a) is far from complete," and "the Court's new standard will... sacrifice,
or at least erode, judicial integrity); Shawn P. Flaherty, Case Note, Liteky v. United States: The
.Entrenchment of an Extrajudicial Source Factor in the Recusal of Federal Judges Under 28
U.S.C. § 455(a), 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 411, 427-29 (1995) (discussing the failings of the Liteky
decision); Lori M. McPherson, Case Note, Liteky v. United States: The Supreme Court Restricts
the Disqualification of Biased Federal Judges Under Section 455(a), 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 1427,
1441-43 (1994) (criticizing the Liteky majority's extension of the extra-judicial source
requirement to § 455(a)); see generally Adam J. Safer, Note, The Illegitimacy of the Extrajudicial
Source Requirement for Judicial Disqualification Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), 15 CARDOZO L. REV.
787, 810-15 (1993) (questioning legitimacy of extrajudicial source requirements). But see Carton,
supra note 41, at 2092-95 (supporting the maintenance of the "extrajudicial limitation).
80. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 553-54 (1994).
81. Id. at 554-55.
82. Id. at 551.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 555.
85. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
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4. Appellate Review
The operation of § 455(a) is further limited by the standard for
review on appeal, the availability of review, and the application of the
harmless error doctrine to disqualification decisions. The legislative
history behind the 1974 amendments sets the abuse of discretion
standard as the standard for appellate review of disqualification is-
sues.' Courts uniformly apply the abuse of discretion standard on ap-
pellate review, which gives a high degree of deference to the disquali-
fication determination made by the trial judge." Courts are not
uniform, however, on exactly when and how appellate review is avail-
able. Many litigants demand a petition for writ of mandamus to chal-
lenge the judge's refusal to recuse himself.' But a writ of mandamus,
however, has historically been an extraordinary remedy, reserved for
only the most egregious cases." Some courts will allow an inter-
locutory appeal,' and others will not hear the appeal at all until the
judgment is final.9 ' Courts uniformly apply the harmless error rule to
appeals under § 455(a).92 The Supreme Court has held, however, that
86. "The issue of disqualification is a sensitive question of assessing all the facts and
circumtances [sic] in order to determine whether the failure to disqualify was an abuse of sound
judicial discretion." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 6355 (emphasis added).
87. See, e.g., David v. City & County of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344, 1351 (10th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Mizell, 88 F.3d 288, 299 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Adams, 31 F.3d 389, 396 (6th Cir.
1994); Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1993); Town of Norfolk v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers, 968 F.2d 1438, 1460 (1st Cir. 1992).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Horton, 98 F.3d 313, 316-17 (7th Cir. 1996); In re School
Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 770 (3d Cir. 1992), as amended; In re City of Houston, 745 F.2d
925, 927 (5th Cir. 1984) (mandamus is an extreme remedy, and will only lie in extraordinary
circumstances); In re IBM, 618 F.2d 923, 926-27 (2d Cir. 1980). Compare In re United States,
666 F.2d 690, 695 (1st Cir. 1981) (mandamus available), with United States v. Parrilla Bonilla,
626 F.2d 177, 179 n.2 (lst Cir. 1980) (indicating exercise of appellate jurisdiction equally
available with exercise of mandamus power).
89. See, e.g., In re City of Houston, 745 F.2d 925, 927 (5th Cir. 1984); In re Corrugated
Container Antitrust Litig., 614 F.2d 958, 961-62 (5th Cir. 1980); SCA Servs., Inc. v. Morgan, 557
F.2d 110, 117 (7th Cir. 1977) (noting that the court has traditionally been "extremely reluctant to
make use of the extraordinary remedy of mandamus'); Green v. Murphy, 259 F.2d 591, 594 (3d
Cir. 1958) (dealing with recusal under § 144, and stating that a writ is an extraordinary remedy
to be "employed justifiably only when rare and exceptional circumstances are present").
90. See, e.g., Lazofsky v. Sommerset Bus Co., 389 F. Supp. 1041, 1045 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). An
interlocutory appeal is an appeal of a trial judge's decision before the final judgment in the case.
See BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 94 (7th ed. 1999).
91. See, e.g., In re City of Detroit, 828 F.2d 1160, 1166-67 (6th Cir. 1987) (noting the court's
"strong belief in the values inherent in the 'final judgment rule'"); City of Cleveland v.
Krupansky, 619 F.2d 576, 578 (6th Cir. 1980); Scarrella v. Midwest Fed. Sav. & Loan, 536 F.2d
1207, 1210 (8th Cir. 1976) (stating that a writ of mandamus is only available after final
judgment).
92. See, e.g., Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 862 (1988); In re
Continental Airlines Corp., 901 F.2d 1259, 1263 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Vespe, 868 F.2d
1328, 1342 (3d Cir. 1989); Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1525-26 (11th Cir. 1988);
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there is a difference between "trial errors" and "structural defects,"
and that only the former would be subject to harmless error analysis."
Structural errors, therefore, are constitutional errors that require re-
versal.9 ' Because these three limits requiring the judgment to be final,
and the difficult burdens of showing abuse of discretion and showing
non-harmless error on the operation of § 455(a) on appeal can be quite
severe, they may have the effect of eliminating not only invalid, but
potentially valid appearance of partiality claims. Should that occur,
the only cases which would survive would be the ones in which some-
thing akin to actual bias could be proven. This, of course, clearly frus-
trates the congressional purpose behind § 455(a).95
III. PLEA BARGAINING AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
A. The Predominance of Plea Bargaining and Guilty Pleas
Plea bargaining is entrenched in the American criminal justice
system. As commentators note, plea bargaining is the behind the
scenes "horse trading' that "determines who goes to jail and for how
long.... It is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the
criminal justice system."' A 1995 study, for example, reported that
about 92% of all federal criminal defendants entered a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere.97
Barry v. United States, 528 F.2d 1094, 1100 (7th Cir. 1976); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 52
(defining harmless error).
93. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963) and Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)) for the proposition that having a
biased judge is a structural error that will never be subject to harmless error. It is unclear why
the appearance of bias would not be a structural error as well. Tumey does not stand for the
proposition that the judge in that case was actually biased, only that "[e]very procedure [offering]
a possible temptation to the average man as a judge ... which might lead him not to hold the
balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused, denies the latter due process of
law." Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532. Furthermore, that decision rested on a violation of the
defendant's due process rights, which seem, under Fulminante, to be a trial error. So, the
apparent assumption that only actual bias will be grounds for automatic reversal is flawed. The
distinction must be something finer than the difference between apparent bias and actual bias,
and must rest on grounds other than whether the error affected the individual's trial or the
judicial process in general.
94. See Fulimante, 499 U.S. at 309-10.
95. See generally discussion supra Part II.C.
96. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909,
1912 (1992).
97. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 476 (1995).
In comparison, of those who went to trial, about 71% were convicted. Of the 54,980 total federal
defendants, approximately 85% were convicted. See id.
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Plea bargaining in general has garnered both strong support
and widespread criticism. 8 Support is usually tendered by the partici-
pants in the process, such as attorneys and judges.9 Most criticism of
the process comes from academia, with opponents asserting its un-
fairness and inefficiency."° Although the efficacy of plea bargaining is
beyond the purview of this Note, it is probably safe to assume that
plea bargaining is now permanently ingrained in our concepts of
ordered justice."'
Despite debate over whether plea bargaining should be abol-
ished, even supporters of the process recognize its flaws. For instance,
commentators earnestly defending the place of plea bargaining in our
criminal justice system still recognize that the system does not ade-
quately provide for the identification of innocent defendants. 2 Fair
and accurate results are a related concern. Some commentators have
suggested that sentencing should be reworked so that prosecutors'
recommendations to the judge for a particular sentence would be a
ceiling, rather than a floor. 3
Moreover, when deciding whether individual plea agreements
should be enforced, commentators have suggested applying classical
contract law analysis to the agreement."' The logical starting place,
then, is the presumption of enforceability.105 The theoretical inquiry
A nolo contendere is a plea that does not admit the charges, but does not deny them either. It
literally means "no contest," and will have the same effect as a guilty plea, but cannot be used
against the defendant in another action. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1070 (7th ed. 1999).
98. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 96, at 1911-12.
99. Although a small number of veteran prosecutors and defense attorneys disapprove of
the plea bargaining process, most do not; even philosophical opponents of plea bargaining
recognize the need for and desirability of such a system. See, e.g., MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA
BARGAINING 158-59 (1978).
100. See generally MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT (1979); Albert W.
Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652 (1981); Albert W.
Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059 (1976); Douglas
G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983
U. ILL. L. REV. 37; Kenneth Kipnis, Plea Bargaining: A Critic's Rejoinder, 13 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
555 (1979); John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (1978);
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43
(1988); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037 (1984);
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 733 (1980).
101. See HEUMANN, supra note 99, at 157 ("Its abolition is an impossibility.'); see also
Priscilla Budeiri, Comment, Collateral Consequences of Guilty Pleas in the Federal Criminal
Justice System, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 157, 165 (1981) ("Given this reliance of the criminal
justice system on plea bargaining, its elimination in the foreseeable future is unlikely.').
102. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 96, passim.
103. See id. at 1959-60; see also H. RICHARD UVILLER, VIRTUAL JUSTICE: THE FLAWED
PROSECUTION OF CRIME IN AMERICA 177, 198 (1996).
104. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 96, passim.
105. See id. at 1917.
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becomes whether this presumption is overcome when a plea bargain is
challenged on the grounds that the process or the product of the bar-
gain is defective. The primary inquiry becomes whether either the
manner in which the bargain was contrived or the actual outcome un-
dermines the social utility of the bargain or is fundamentally unfair."
Just as in contract law, one would assume that the presumption of
enforceability would rarely be overcome. However, those few cases
embodying truly disturbing plea bargains-i.e., those that offend our
notions of fundamental fairness and due process-are the correct tar-
get for judicial resources aimed at remedying the resulting social and
individual injustices.
B. The Anatomy of a Guilty Plea: The Procedures
1. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Rule 11
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs
federal criminal pleas."7 In general, pleas may take three forms: not
guilty, guilty, or nolo contendere."' Guilty pleas may take one of two
forms: conditional or unconditional. A conditional plea "reserv[es] in
writing the right, on appeal from the judgment, to review of the ad-
verse determination of any specified pretrial motion."" Conditional
guilty pleas must have the consent of the prosecutor and approval of
the judge."' An unconditional guilty plea, by implication, does not re-
serve the right to appeal any adverse pretrial decisions. Rule 11(e)
contemplates three available bargains:" a plea in exchange for dis-
missal or reduction of some of the charges;"' a plea in exchange for a
106. See id. Professors Scott and Stuntz are most concerned with rebutting the argument
that these objections-that the social utility or fundamental fairness of the bargain is
undermined by the process or the outcome of the bargain-rendered the entire institution of plea
bargaining futile and unjust. See id. They argue instead that inequalities in individual bargains
can and should be dealt with individually within the court system, just as civil contract
enforcement is handled. If the application of contract principles renders some plea agreements
suspect, then judicial resources should be aimed at remedying those deficiencies. When the
bargains themselves are faulty (e.g., contracts of enslavement) or when there is such a disparity
in bargaining power that one party is essentially deprived of the benefits of its bargain (e.g.,
contracts of adhesion), the courts refuse to enforce those contracts rather than banning
contracting altogether. See id.
107. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
108. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(1); see also supra note 97 (explaining nolo contendere).
109. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2).
110. See id.
111. Because the definition of "conditional guilty plea" deals only with reserving issues for
appeal, any of these three bargains can be either conditional or unconditional.
112. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(1)(A).
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sentencing recommendation;... or, a plea in exchange for a specific
sentence."
2. Protections for the Defendant Pleading Guilty
Defendants have neither a constitutionally guaranteed right to
plea bargain,"5 nor a right to plead guilty."6 If plea bargaining does
occur, however, Rule 11 governs the conduct of the parties and the
court during negotiations. The procedures in Rule 11(c)-(g) are in-
tended to help form a complete record of the factors relevant to
determining voluntariness at the time the plea is entered, and to
make the constitutionally required determination that a defendant's
guilty plea is in fact voluntary." ' These protections, to the extent that
they ensure an individual's "substantial rights," are designed to guar-
antee that the plea bargaining process satisfies the Due Process
Clause.1 8 Technical variations from Rule l1's procedures that do not
affect "substantial rights" are subject to harmless error analysis on
appeal.1
9
Rule 11(c) requires that the court apprise the defendant of the
possible consequences of his plea. These include information regarding
the maximum and minimum penalties provided by the law under
which the defendant is charged, including the fact that the judge can
depart from the sentencing guidelines in certain circumstances.2 ' The
court must also remind the defendant of his right to the assistance of
counsel,u" to a jury trial, to confront his accusers, and to refuse to in-
113. See FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(e)(1)(B). This may also be an agreement that the prosecutor
will not oppose a defendant's request for a particular sentence. See id. Judges, however, are not
bound by prosecutors' recommendations regarding sentencing. See id.
114. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(1)(C). The court has discretion to reject the specific sentence.
In that instance, the court will usually allow the defendant to withdraw the plea. See FED. R.
CRIM. P. 11(e)(2).
115. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977); see also Nguyn v. United States,
114 F.3d 699, 704 (8th Cir. 1997) (prosecutor has prerogative to offer package deal or no deal at
all); United States v. West, 2 F.3d 66, 69 (4th Cir. 1993) (plea agreement has no constitutional
significance unless and until consummated by judgment of court); Guidubaldi & Kim, supra note
8, at 1510.
116. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 nn.10-11 (1970) (under certain
circumstances, a judge may refuse to accept the defendant's plea).
117. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465-66 (1969); see also FED. R. CRIM. P.
11(d).
118. McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466.
119. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(h).
120. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1).
121. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(2).
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criminate himself."n The court is not required, however, to inform the
defendant of possible collateral consequences of pleading guilty."n
Rule 11(d) embodies the voluntariness inquiry."' Rule 11(e)
governs the court's duties when notifying the parties of his acceptance
or rejection of the plea. Rule 11(f is the requirement that the judge
satisfy himself that the plea being entered has a factual basis. Rule
11(g) requires that the plea colloquy be captured in the record, in-
cluding the advice the court gives the defendant, the voluntariness
inquiry, and the accuracy inquiry.' These rules ensure that the judge
makes a thorough inquiry into the legitimacy of the plea and that an
adequate basis exists in the record so that an appellate court may
evaluate the plea process.
3. Judicial and Prosecutorial Consent to a Conditional Plea
In order for a defendant to enter a conditional guilty plea, he
must get the consent of the prosecutor and the approval of the judge.'
Prosecutors and judges often may have legitimate concerns about con-
senting to a conditional plea. 7 The court may refuse to accept a condi-
tional plea for any reason or for no reason at all.' The purpose behind
conditional pleas is to prevent the waste of judicial resources expended
on a trial just so that a defendant who has lost a pretrial motion may
preserve that issue on appeal. 9 For these reasons, at least one court
has held that for a conditional plea to be appropriate, the issue pre-
served for appeal should be dispositive of the case.3
122. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3).
123. See generally Budeiri, supra note 101. These may include consequences such as three-
strikes laws, loss of voting rights and others. See id.
124. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d); see generally discussion infra Part M.B.5.
125. It is imperative to have a complete record of the transaction on appeal. See FED. R.
CRIM. P. 11(g) advisory committee's note.
126. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2).
127. These legitimate concerns include a desire for finality, a concern that if the defendant
succeeds on appeal, the delay that has ensued could hamper a subsequent trial, and avoiding
increased appellate litigation. It is equally possible, however, for judges and prosecutors to have
illegitimate motives for withholding consent to conditional pleas. See generally discussion infra
Part V.B.
128. See United States v. Davis, 900 F.2d 1524, 1527 (10th Cir. 1990).
129. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee's note; see also JAMES C. CISSELL, FEDERAL
CRIMINAL TRIALS 176 (4th ed. 1996). This is entirely possible because many decisions are not
appealable until a final judgment has been entered in the case.
130. See United States v. Wong Ching Hing, 867 F.2d 754, 758 (2d Cir. 1989).
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4. The Role of the Judge in Guilty Pleas
While it is primarily the duty of the judge to ensure the defen-
dant's plea is voluntary, knowing, and uncoerced,'3' the judge may not
participate in the plea negotiation itself."2 Instead the judge's role is
supervisory as the parties come to the judge after they have decided
on a deal." This is where the protections of Rule 11 come into opera-
tion. The judge has three primary duties regarding the guilty plea-
making sure the plea: is truly voluntary,"M has a basis in fact,"3 5 and
would further the effective administration of justice." The court must
inform the defendant of the constitutional rights he is waiving by
pleading guilty. '3
Because the judge has broad discretion over whether to accept
or reject the plea,'38 commentators have suggested that this inverts the
traditional/contract structure:
[l]n contract terms the bargain is not really between the defendant and the prosecutor,
since the prosecutor can make only token commitments. The true contracting parties
are the defendant and the judge. The prosecutor acts as the judge's negotiating agent,
but the judge retains the authority to accept or reject his agent's work.139
This is particularly dangerous, because rather than a bargaining
model where the bargaining parties are on roughly equal footing, the
judge/defendant bargaining model shows a severe disparity in bar-
gaining power.40 Furthermore, a public perception that the judge is
131. See, e.g., Fogus v. United States, 34 F.2d 97, 98 (4th Cir. 1929). As the Advisory
Committee's Notes point out, Rule 11 is substantially a restatement of this concept. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee's note. See generally Abraham S. Goldstein, Converging
Criminal Justice Systems: Guilty Pleas and the Public Interest, 49 SMU L. REV. 567 (1996).
132. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(1)(C); see also United States v. Casallas, 59 F.3d 1173, 1176,
1178 (11th Cir. 1995) (pointing out to defendant the difference between potential post-trial
sentence and plea bargain, and advising him to confer with his lawyer, was impermissible
intervention in plea negotiations); accord United States v. Anderson, 993 F.2d 1435, 1438-39 (9th
Cir. 1993) (threatening to forbid prosecutor to accept plea to fewer than all thirty counts
charged). A judge may be able to cure the defect of his impermissible intervention by permitting
the defendant to withdraw his plea. See United States v. Washington, 109 F.3d 459, 464 (8th
Cir. 1997).
133. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(5).
134. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c), (d).
135. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f).
136. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b) (regarding a no/o contendere plea); 11(e)(2)-(4) (regarding the
judge's discretion to accept or reject a plea).
137. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3).(4).
138. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(3)-(4); see also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262
(1971); accord United States v. Aguilera, 654 F.2d 352, 353 (Former 5th Cir. 1981); United States
v. Moore, 637 F.2d 1194, 1196 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Ocanas, 628 F.2d 353, 358 (5th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Jackson, 563 F.2d 1145, 1147 (4th Cir. 1977).
139. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 96, at 1954-55.
140. See id. at 1955.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:983
undertaking increased participation in the plea bargaining process
could have negative consequences. " If a judge convinces a defendant
to accept a plea, the judge is no longer objective but is now acting as
an advocate in the process. And when judges lose their objective
status, it undermines the public's faith in the criminal justice
system."
5. Is the Plea Truly Voluntary?
A guilty plea is itself a conviction,"" as well as an admission of
all the elements or material facts of the charge.'" A guilty plea may
waive nonjurisdictional defects occurring before the plea," as well as
some constitutional rights.1 4 1 The Supreme Court has been reluctant,
however, to hold that a guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional er-
rors.4 7 A guilty plea does not waive jurisdictional errors.14s In Menna v.
New York, the Supreme Court defined jurisdictional issues (i.e., non-
waivable issues) as those that are directed at protecting something
other than the truth-seeking process."' These would include a double
jeopardy claim," a claim that the indictment fails to state an of-
141. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e) (evidencing a concern that increased participation by judges
is harmful).
142. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 96, at 1955 n.155.
143. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
144. See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989).
145. See, e.g., Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (guilty plea waived defendant's
objection that he was deprived of his constitutional right because blacks had been excluded from
the grand jury which indicted him); United States v. Robinson, 20 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1994)
(guilty plea to bank robbery waived 41-year-old third-year law student's objection to, inter alia,
change of venue on grounds that it denied her the right to counsel of her choice); United States v.
Vaughan, 13 F.3d 1186, 1187-88 (8th Cir. 1994) (guilty plea waived defendants objection that his
indictment violated a previous plea agreement).
146. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243 (waives constitutional rights to trial by jury, to confront
accusers, and the privilege against self-incrimination).
147. See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975) (per curiam) ("Neither Tollett nor
our earlier cases on which it relied, e.g., Brady and McMann, stand for the proposition that
counseled guilty pleas inevitably 'waive' all antecedent constitutional violations.") (citations
omitted), cited with approval in United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 573 (1989) ("[w]aiver was
not the basic ingredient of this line of cases," referring to the Brady trilogy) (citation omitted).
148. See supra note 8.
149. See Menna, 423 U.S. at 63 n.2:
A guilty plea, therefore, simply renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not
logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand
in the way of conviction, if factual guilt is validly established.... [Tihe claim is that the
State may not convict petitioner no matter how validly his factual guilt is established.
The guilty plea, therefore, does not bar the claim.
150. See id.
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fense,"' and a claim that the trial judge lacked impartiality.5 ' By im-
plication, all other rights are waivable.
Because of the possibility of waiving such important rights, it is
imperative that the plea be "voluntary and knowing. '"" As stated ear-
lier, it is the court's responsibility to ensure the plea is voluntary. But
once the judge has satisfied himself that it is voluntary, a strong pre-
sumption of voluntariness attaches." Should the defendant wish to
challenge voluntariness by way of appeal, he must satisfy a heavy
burden of persuasion.' To prove that the plea was involuntary, the
defendant must show that the "fear of the possible consequences of not
pleading guilty destroyed [the defendant's] ability to balance the risks
and benefits of going to trial."'" It is possible, but not easy, 57 to invali-
date a plea as unknowing and involuntary if the judge does not fulfill
his duties under Rule 11.1'
IV. CURRENT TREATMENT OF THE APPEALABILITY OF A DENIED
RECUSAL MOTION AFTER ENTRY OF AN UNCONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA
The circuit courts are currently split as to whether an uncondi-
tional guilty plea constitutes a waiver of the appeal of a denied recusal
motion under § 455(a). Of the five circuits having decided the issue,
three circuits have concluded that an unconditional guilty plea consti-
tutes a waiver of all nonjurisdictional issues, including a claim that
151. See, e.g., United States v. Ruelas, 106 F.3d 1416, 1418 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Fitzhugh, 78 F.3d 1326, 1330 (8th Cir. 1996).
152. See United States v. Troxell, 887 F.2d 830, 833-34 (7th Cir. 1989) (guilty plea did not
waive challenge of judge's actual bias); United States v. Gipson, 835 F.2d 1323, 1324-25 (10th
Cir. 1988) (guilty plea did not waive judge's refusal to recuse himself under 28 U.S.C. §
455(b)(3)).
153. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (for guilty plea to be valid under
Due Process Clause, it must be voluntary and knowing;, relying on Zerbst test for waiver of
constitutional rights).
154. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) ("Solemn declarations in open court
carry a strong presumption of verity."); United States v. Abreo, 30 F.3d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1994)
United States v. Vaughan, 13 F.3d 1186, 1187 (8th Cir. 1994).
155. See United States v. Ranum, 96 F.3d 1020, 1025 (7th Cir. 1996).
156. See Guidubaldi & Kim, supra note 8, at 1532 & n.1386 (citing Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 750-51 (1970) (holding that "guilty plea [was] voluntary even though motivated by
desire to avoid death penalty because defendants ability to balance risks of going to trial not
overcome by threat of death penalty")).
157. Rule 11(h) provides for a harmless error analysis for any technical violations of the rule.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(h). For a discussion of harmless error, see supra Part I.D.4.
158. See, e.g., McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 467 (guilty plea invalid under Rule 11 (now 11(d))
because judge did not address defendant individually to determine voluntariness); United States
v. Medina-Silverio, 30 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1994) (guilty plea invalid under Rule 11(c) because
judge did not conduct plea colloquy, only incorporated plea agreement into record by reference).
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the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned." The other
two circuits have concluded the opposite-that an unconditional guilty
plea does not foreclose the possibility of review of a denied recusal
motion.' The stances are irreconcilable. The cases have split on how
§ 455(a) and Rule 11 should interact in a criminal case. Either the Su-
preme Court should grant certiorari a case to reconcile the dis-
agreement, or Congress should amend § 455 to clarify how it inter-
relates with Rule 11.
A. Unconditional Guilty Plea is Waiver of All Nonjurisdictional
Issues Including a Denied Recusal Motion
1. United States v. Gipson
A United States Court of Appeals first considered the issue in
1988. In United States v. Gipson, the Tenth Circuit addressed whether
Gipson's unconditional guilty plea constituted a waiver of his right to
appeal the denial of a recusal motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 4552161
Gipson had moved for the trial judge's recusal on the grounds that the
judge was a United States Attorney when the defendant had been
convicted of a similar offense." The trial judge then inquired into the
previous case and determined that he had not participated in the
preparation or prosecution of that case." He thereafter denied the
recusal motion."M Gipson then entered an unconditional guilty plea,
but appealed after sentencing."
The court of appeals held that a plea waives the right to appeal
a denial of recusal under § 455(a), but not under § 455(b). The rea-
soning rested on the statutory language of § 455(e), which allows
waivers under subsection (a) but not subsection (b). The court
reasoned further: "[i]f a party can waive recusal, it would follow that
denial of recusal is a pretrial defect which is sublimated within a
159. See United States v. Hoctel, 154 F.3d 506, 508 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Troxell,
887 F.2d 830, 833 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Gipson, 835 F.2d 1323, 1325 (10th Cir. 1988).
160. See United States v. Brinkworth, 68 F.3d 633, 638 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v.
Chantal, 902 F.2d 1018, 1021 (1st Cir. 1990).
161. See United States v. Gipson, 835 F.2d 1323, 1324 (10th Cir. 1988).
162. See id.
163. See id. Had he in fact participated in the first prosecution, the judge's recusal would




166. See id. at 1325.
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guilty plea and thereafter unavailable as an issue for appeal."'16 7 In
relation to § 455(b), the court said § 455(e) creates a jurisdictional
limitation on the ability of a judge to hear a specific case."8 The court
noted what it called the "dichotomous situation" presented by the
statute: that parties are permitted to waive the appearance of judicial
partiality, but are prohibited from waiving the presumption of the fact
of partiality."
2. United States v. Troxell
One year after Gipson, the Seventh Circuit addressed the same
issue. In United States v. Troxell, the defendant entered an uncondi-
tional guilty plea to two charges: the first for cocaine distribution, and
the second for failing to appear for sentencing in the first case.'70 Judge
Mills presided over both cases."' Troxell filed two separate motions
requesting the judge to recuse himself, one in each case."' The judge
denied both motions."' After the guilty plea, Troxell appealed.' In
determining that the motion for recusal in the narcotics case was at
best a § 455(a) challenge, the court said it "need not review Troxell's
claim that Judge Mills should have recused himself."'75 The court
stated that a denial of a motion for recusal based on § 455(a) could
only be challenged with a writ of mandamus, " and thus it was not
reviewable on direct appeal. It reasoned that when "a judge proceeds
in a case when there is [only] an appearance of impropriety... the
injury is to the judicial system as a whole [rather than] to the sub-
stantial rights of the parties.'7 7
The court emphasized that once a judgment is entered in a case
in which an appearance of impropriety exists, the damage to the pub-




170. See United States v. Troxell, 887 F.2d 830, 831 (7th Cir. 1989).
171. See id. at 832.
172. See id. at 832-33.
173. See id. at 832.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 833. The motion to recuse for the bail-jumping charge found its fate in the
extrajudicial source doctrine. The court said even if Judge Mills was actually prejudiced against
Troxell, his comments failed to reflect any knowledge gained outside of the judicial process. See
id. at 834. The court did cite Gipson, however, for the proposition that charges of actual bias





by a direct appeal." Therefore, Troxell is similar to Gipson in the
holding that a § 455(a) challenge does not survive an unconditional
guilty plea.
3. United States v. Hoctel
In the 1998 decision of United States v. Hoctel, the Fifth Circuit
entered the debate, and joined in on the side of the Gipson and Troxell
decisions. " Hoctel was indicted for mail and wire fraud arising out of
a horse-selling scheme.' The two United States Marshals assigned to
security in the courtroom were to be witnesses against Hoctel, so Hoc-
tel filed a motion to have them relieved of their courtroom duties in
connection with the case."' This motion was granted, but Hoctel then
filed a motion seeking to have the trial judge recuse himself based on
his assertion that the judge's daily interaction with the two marshals
might lead a reasonable person to question the judge's ability to be
impartial toward the defense." The judge denied the motion. Hoctel
then pled guilty to aiding and abetting and mail fraud.'8
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found that Hoctel's unconditional
guilty plea, as well as his specific waiver of any appeal other than a
sentencing departure, waived his § 455(a) challenge."8 The court gave
a brief account of the conflicting arguments in Gipson, Chantal, and
Brinkworth, before agreeing with Gipson." The court based its short
opinion on the solitary rationale that the statutory scheme of § 455
clearly contemplated the availability of a waiver of § 455(a), and the
defendant was not precluded from waiving his § 455(a) claim." The
court noted, in conclusion, that Hoctel did not produce any evidence to
suggest that his waiver was uninformed or involuntary. "
178. See id. (citing Durham v. Neopolitan, 875 F.2d 91, 97 (7th Cir. 1989)).
179. United States v. Hoctel, 154 F.3d 506 (5th Cir. 1998).
180. See id. at 506.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See id. at 507. His plea agreement specifically waived his right to appeal his sentence
on any ground except an upward departure from the applicable sentencing guideline range. See
id. It was, therefore, an unconditional specific sentence guilty plea, because the plea was not
conditioned on being able to appeal any adverse pretrial motions. See generally discussion supra
Part Ill.B.1. (regarding the difference between conditional and unconditional guilty pleas).
184. See id. at 508.
185. See id. Although the Troxell decision by the Seventh Circuit, supra Part IV.A.2, had





B. Unconditional Guilty Plea Does Not Waive Ability to
Challenge a Denied Recusal Motion
1. United States v. Chantal
The First Circuit addressed the issue in 1990 in United States
v. Chantal.'" Chantal was first brought before the trial judge on drug
charges in July 1987." He pled guilty and was released on bail pend-
ing sentencing." While out on bail, Chantal "was caught red-handed"
in a second drug incident in September, and that indictment was re-
turned in December. 1' In the meantime, Chantal's sentencing hearing
occurred for the first indictment in October (after he had been caught
in the second incident, but before he was indicted for it).'92
The judge, unaware of the second indictment, characterized
him as an "unreconstructed drug trafficker" in which he could have
"no confidence whatever that he will change his ways in the future.''93
When Chantal came before the same judge on the second drug charge,
he filed a motion requesting the judge to recuse himself because of the
forceful remarks made at the sentencing hearing on the first charge.""
The judge denied the motion, and Chantal entered a guilty plea.'95
Chantal appealed.
In a thorough and well-reasoned opinion, the First Circuit held
that Chantal's unconditional guilty plea did not foreclose the possibil-
ity of an appeal from the denial of a motion to recuse under § 455(a)."
The court based its decision on a number of grounds. First, the court
looked at Congress's purpose in enacting § 455(a), and expressed its
disagreement that Congress would have intended that its purpose ("to
assure actions by judges who are not only impartial but appear to be")
could be "so unintelligibly eradicated by a plea engendered by the im-
mediate prospect of a trial/decision by a biased judge.'.9 Second, the
court briefly addressed waiver, in essence saying that attainment of
adjudication by a court that was impartial in fact and appearance was
188. United States v. Chantal, 902 F.2d 1018 (1st Cir. 1990).
189. See id. at 1019.
190. See id.
191. Id. at 1020.
192. See id.
193. Id. The circuit court described the trial judge's remarks as "irretractible but regrettable








not something that could be casually waived, except as authorized by
the statute-i.e., a guilty plea was not a clear waiver."' Third, the
court battled the prosecution's argument that Chantal should have
entered a conditional guilty plea under Rule 11(a)(2). The court recog-
nized the irony in "asking the statutorially disqualified judge for con-
sent to appeal his disqualification" under Rule 11, as well as trying to
force prosecutorial consent in the scope of broad prosecutorial discre-
tion regarding plea bargaining.!9 The court asserted that it would be
"incongruous to hold that for one seeking the benefit of [the protec-
tions of § 455(a)] the consent would have to be obtained from the very
judge whose qualifications are under attack.""° The circuit court re-
versed and remanded the case, with a gentle note to the trial judge to
redetermine whether his impartiality might reasonably be questioned
by a responsible, reasonable person, in light of his statements about
Chantal.2
0 °
2. United States v. Brinkworth
In 1995, in United States v. Brinkworth, 2 the Second Circuit
expressed its agreement with the First Circuit's decision in Chantal.
In this case, Brinkworth was charged in a multi-count indictment with
conspiracy, tax fraud, and mail fraud.' He filed a § 455(a) motion to
disqualify the judge shortly before trial started, and based the motion
on the fact that the judge had supervised two offices that had prose-
cuted Brinkworth several years before the current charges, and on a
rumor that Brinkworth had had a past relationship with the judge's




201. See id. at 1024. The case also rested on the First Circuit's refusal to require the
challenged conduct to be extrajudicial in nature. See id. This was important because the trial
judge's actions were based solely on information obtained in judicial proceedings, and in most
other jurisdictions could not have served as the basis for a recusal motion. See Liteky v. United
States, 510 U.S. 540, 544 (1994); see also discussion supra Part II.D.3. In light of Liteky, the
Chantal court's ultimate decision would likely not be the same today unless the defendant tried
to argue that this conduct fell within the "pervasiveness" exception. See supra notes 82-84 and
accompanying text. However, the proposition that a denial of a recusal motion is still subject to
review regardless of a guilty plea is still good law in the First Circuit.
202. United States v. Brinkworth, 68 F.3d 633 (2d Cir. 1995).
203. See id. at 635-36.




by the government, accompanied the motion.' The judge denied the
motion.' Brinkworth asked the judge if he would agree to a plea con-
ditioned on the appeal of the denied motion to recuse.' The judge de-
clined to approve a conditional plea, noting that the Chantal decision
may control the issue, and that under that decision Brinkworth would
be able to appeal even after entering an unconditional plea.' Brink-
worth then entered an unconditional guilty plea to one count of falsi-
fying tax returns.' Following sentencing by a different judge, Brink-
worth appealed."'
The Second Circuit was squarely confronted with the question
of whether it could review the trial judge's refusal to recuse himself
under § 455(a). The government offered the standard argument-that
a guilty plea waives all but specifically reserved and jurisdictional
defenses.1 ' The court then undertook an evaluation of the Chantal and
Gipson decisions. In rejecting Gipson as formalistic, the court noted
that Gipson was based on the idea that a denial of a recusal motion is
a pretrial defect that a guilty plea waives, rather than an error that
affects the integrity of the entire judicial process.' In accepting the
reasoning of Chantal, the court reiterated that Congress did not in-
tend § 455(a) to be circumvented so easily.1 Further, the court rea-
soned that because a judge has authority over both § 455(a) motions
and Rule 11(a)(2) conditional guilty pleas, he could effectively deny the
defendant any outlet for review of these decisions simply by denying
one, and refusing to approve the other. " An interest in judicial econ-
omy also compelled this decision, because, as the court noted, if a de-
fendant had no way to preserve this critical issue on appeal without
going to trial, he would force the issue by insisting on a trial that need
not occur."5 Ultimately, however, the court refused to grant Brink-
worth relief because his motion was not filed timely.
216
205. See id. at 636. The government offered a witness who said he had overheard the judge
say that "'[i]f Kevin [Brinkworth] thinks he is getting his case out of my Court, he has another
thing [sic] coming.'" See id.
206. See id. The stated reasons were that it was not timely, was based on rumors and false
information, and was an apparent attempt to judge-shop for a judge that would commit to a




210. See id. at 636-37.
211. See id. (citing United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 718 (2d Cir. 1965)).




216. See id. at 639-40.
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V. WHEN UNCONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEAS AND § 455(a) RECUSAL
MOTIONS MEET
If the goals of the criminal justice system are truth and justice,
we disserve those goals by not allowing a criminal defendant to chal-
lenge his own unconditional guilty plea by way of appeal on the
grounds that the judge who accepted the plea did not appear impar-
tial. It is imperative that our judiciary appear impartial, as evidenced
by Congress's enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 455. It is equally imperative
that criminal defendants have the proper protections when choosing to
make guilty pleas, as evidenced by Rule 11. The policy choices behind
both 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and Rule 11 should not be completely under-
mined just because they happen to coincide in a single case. The
waiver doctrine, as applied in this context, does not sufficiently guar-
antee the realization of the goals of both the appearance of impartial-
ity in the judiciary and the voluntariness of criminal guilty pleas. The
guarantees embodied in Rule 11 are futile if the judge guarding them
does not appear impartial toward the individual criminal defendant.
Judicial economy will be served by a rule that allows a criminal defen-
dant to enter an unconditional guilty plea (foregoing trial) but still
retain the right to appeal a denied motion to recuse. The proper rem-
edy in some cases is to allow the criminal defendant to withdraw his
plea an appeal of the denied recusal motion. This rule will serve the
interests of justice, avoid even the appearance of judicial bias, and
protect the rights of a criminal defendant charged with a federal
crime.
A. The Case Against Waiver
Although § 455(e) clearly contemplates the availability of a
waiver to § 455(a),"1 7 in most cases an unconditional guilty plea alone,
following a denial of a recusal motion, will not meet the requirements
of waiver. This is true for a number of reasons. Since § 455(a) is man-
datory and self-enforcing, it should only be waivable when the judge is
not aware of the existence of the circumstances calling his impartiality
into question."8 Otherwise a judge will not have an incentive to recuse
himself or may even act in bad faith. Also, an unconditional guilty
plea, to be quite literal, does not satisfy the requirement under
§ 455(e) that the basis for the disqualification be set out in the record.
217. See generally discussion supra Part lI.D.1 (discussing § 455(e)).
218. See generally id. (describing the difference between waiver and remittal, and suggesting
remittal is what was contemplated by Congress in § 455(e)).
[Vol. 53:9831012
APPEARANCE OF BIAS
As explained above, an unconditional guilty plea does not usually spe-
cifically waive anything, much less set out the facts necessary under
subsection (e) for finding a specific waiver.
Furthermore, the requirements of a waiver under § 455(e), al-
though simple, hint at what Congress intended a waiver of a § 455(a)
claim to mean. Section 455(e) speaks of a waiver "being accepted pro-
vided it is preceded by a full disclosure on the record of the basis for
disqualification." '19 Canon 3E of the ABA's Code of Judicial Conduct
and the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Kelly recognized this as a
remittal requirement,' by which the parties could agree, on their
own, that the judge should not be disqualified despite the appearance
of impropriety. This type of waiver furthers the purpose of bolstering
public confidence in the judiciary, because, in essence, the judge would
be saying on the record, 'There are circumstances present that would
make it look bad for me to stay on my own, and I am willing to step
down to avoid that perception. However, if the parties agree that I am
not biased, and should handle their case, I'll stay." In that case, the
public could not have an objection to the judge's continuing to hear the
action, because both parties will have made an informed decision that
the judge is in fact not biased. Therefore, public confidence in the im-
partiality of the judiciary would not be harmed.
Moreover, a waiver under § 455(e) seems to indicate that the
parties agree to continue with the case, with the full participation of
the judge. A guilty plea, however, is the antithesis of this; it is a quick
and easy way to remove the participation by the judge. It is in essence
a reaction to the judge's refusal to recuse himself--"if you won't step
down as judge, I will get out of your courtroom as quickly as possible
to avoid potentially biased decisions." Under these circumstances, a
guilty plea is the lesser of two evils-going to trial with a biased judge
or pleading guilty to a knowable range of penalties and trying to ap-
peal later. In this instance, choosing to plead guilty actually furthers
the purpose of encouraging confidence in the judicial system. The
public will surely be less aware, at any rate, of a guilty plea accepted
by a potentially biased judge than it will be of a full blown trial in
front of that same judge.
Once a criminal defendant has made a motion requesting the
judge to recuse himself, it is illogical to assume that because the judge
refuses, all public concern for judicial integrity will be eliminated.
Because a judge's decision on the question of whether his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned will in some cases be incorrect, those
219. 28 U.S.C. § 455(e) (1994) (emphasis added).
220. See generally discussion supra Part II.D.1.
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people that question the judge's impartiality will not be satisfied un-
less the judge's decision on this issue is affirmed on appeal or the par-
ties subsequently agree that the judge is not biased. And subsequent
agreement by the parties is unlikely if one party has already re-
quested the judge to step down.
The inquiry into the voluntariness of the waiver is also hin-
dered by entry of a guilty plea following the judge's refusal to recuse
himself. The need for the waiver to be voluntary is particularly acute
in this context because of the unique power disparity between a judge
whose impartiality is reasonably in question and the defendant
standing before him for judgment.' One could imagine the unique
paradox of having to choose between pleading guilty or going to trial
with a judge who does not reasonably appear impartial. Furthermore,
the fear of the possible consequences of going to trial with a judge
whose impartiality the defendant has already questioned could
severely limit the defendant's ability to make a rational cost-benefit
analysis of going to trial. Having to make this Hobson's choice is fun-
damentally unfair to the defendant, particularly because the judicial
system itself would be at fault for his quandary."n
B. The Futility of Rule 11's Guarantees if Guarded by a
Judge Who Does Not Appear Impartial
Because a judge has the power to accept or reject guilty pleas,'
as well as deny recusal motions,"4 it is extremely important that when
these two powers meet, there is a check on their operation to ensure
that one does not influence the other. As explained earlier, judges
have a central role in the acceptance of guilty pleas, on a number of
levels. First, the judge can withhold his approval of a conditional plea
that reserves the right to appeal one of his orders, and essentially
force a defendant to either waive the right, or go through the time,
expense, and humiliation of trial to reserve it.' In a normal criminal
case, that may not necessarily be a problem."G When combined with a
221. See generally discussion supra Part I.B.4.
222. The quandary is particularly distasteful here because, as opposed to an average
criminal defendant, this defendant is not at fault for placing himself in this situation. The
defendant has simply requested the opportunity to have a reasonably impartial judge hear his
case, and, by no fault of his own, has been denied that opportunity.
223. See generally discussion supra Part III.B.4.
224. See generally discussion supra Part I.C.
225. See generally discussion supra Part III.B.4.
226. In a normal criminal case, the prospects of going to trial are not so terrible as compared
to pleading guilty. The benefits of going to trial, of course, are the possibilities of being acquitted
or getting a light sentence. For a defendant faced with what appears to be an impartial judge,
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circumstance where the judge's impartiality is in question, however,
the very essence of judicial fairness is at stake. As the court stated in
Chantal, no one would seriously argue that a judge would always arbi-
trarily withhold consent to a conditional plea reserving the right to
challenge the judge's appearance of impartiality. 7 But requiring that
the judge consent to such a challenge is completely contrary to the
stated purpose behind § 455' as well as fundamental fairness. As an
initial matter, it assumes that the alleged bias will not affect the
judge's decision on the particular recusal motion, even though the
potential bias may be enough to affect all of the judge's decisions.
Without meaningful review of the trial court's decision to refuse re-
cusal, the judge would have unfettered discretion. The judge might
refuse any but the harshest plea bargains that almost force the defen-
dant to go to trial, where he is subject to the worst available punish-
ments. After a trial, the defendant's only recourse is to appeal the
recusal decision, which is going to be given a high degree of deference
by the reviewing court.' This, in and of itself, could indicate that such
a criminal defendant has no choice whatsoever in the plea bargaining
context.
Rule 11 would also be completely undermined if it was admin-
istered by a judge that reasonable people believe is not capable of im-
partial judgment. The prophylactic measures in Rule 11 become ab-
solutely meaningless when a defendant stands before a judge whose
impartiality is in doubt, and is questioned regarding the sufficiency of
the factual basis for the plea, the voluntariness of the plea, and the
suitable punishment for the charge. The defendant would be forced to
pay lip service to an agreement that is involuntary or coerced.
The possibility of prosecutorial and judicial collusion is also
very real in this context. Knowing that the judge should recuse him-
self, but will not, and knowing that the judge can keep the defendant
from being able to appeal the decision, the prosecutor would be free to
require the defendant to plead unconditionally so long as he could re-
mind him of the enormous costs of going to trial, both in time, money,
humiliation, and the likely outcome under a judge whose impartiality
is questionable.' The normal plea bargaining protections would not
however, it cannot be said that the benefits of going to trial could even theoretically outweigh the
costs in terms of fairness, accuracy, and the prospect of acquittal or reduced punishment. To
that defendant, no such benefits exist.
227. See United States v. Chantal, 902 F.2d 1018, 1021 (1st Cir. 1990).
228. See id.
229. See generally discussion supra Part ll.D.4.
230. The worst case scenario for the criminal defendant here would be trial. As stated
before, this is not true for the average defendant. See generally Schulhofer, supra note 100. In
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exist for this defendant. He could not rely on bargaining principles to
check prosecutorial discretion, because the defendant would have no
real ability to refuse the plea offered by the government. He could not
rely on the judge's objectivity to ensure that the end result is fair.
Finally, he could not rely on the possibility of appeal to check both the
prosecutor and the judge, because the judge could foreclose that option
altogether.
C. Judicial Economy Concerns Cut Both Ways
In its quest for finality, the court system has embraced the con-
cept of waiver to foreclose options in order to achieve a final decision.
This is true for a number of reasons; the most important is that judi-
cial resources are scarce and decisions have to be made as to where,
when, and for what causes those resources will be spent."l The social
utility of a guilty plea is that our already overloaded judicial system
does not have to spend as many resources as it usually would for a
trial to get the same result.' Given the benefits of plea bargains, ar-
guments for not allowing defendants to appeal certain issues after
they plead guilty should be based on reasoning that benefits derived
from allowing these appeals are outweighed by their costs. Conversely,
an argument for allowing such appeals is that the costs in resources
are worth the societal or individual benefit derived from their
outcomes.
By not allowing a defendant to appeal a denial of a recusal mo-
tion after pleading guilty unconditionally, the judicial system might be
forcing an innocent defendant to give up his right to a trial without a
biased judge and instead choose to plead guilty. Not only is the indi-
vidual harmed, but society is harmed from the diminished public con-
fidence in a defendant not being able to obtain review of the decisions
of an apparently biased judge. In the alternative, society is harmed if
the defendant goes to trial with the biased judge because the appear-
ance of bias diminishes public confidence in the judiciary.
By allowing criminal defendants to appeal the denied recusal
motion, we can insert a check into the system to ensure that individ-
ual and societal needs are correctly balanced. It is quite possible to do
this without sacrificing judicial economy. A criminal defendant, faced
with what appears to be a partial judge, may request the judge's re-
all of his articles, Schulhofer marshalls the argument that plea bargaining is inherently
problematic, because a trial is preferable for the average defendant.




cusal. If the judge refuses to step down, the defendant may plead
guilty unconditionally, and forego the time and expense of trial. Fol-
lowing sentencing, the criminal defendant may either accept his sen-
tence and serve his time, 3 or decide to appeal the denied recusal
motion. Should the appeal be successful, the defendant will be back in
the position he was in before the denied recusal motion. Thus, not only
will the judicial system have been spared the embarrassment of a
public trial adjudicated by a judge who does not reasonably appear im-
partial, but the judicial resources involved in having a full-blown trial
just to be able to reserve the right to appeal the denied recusal motion
will have been saved.
D. The Appropriate Remedy
Deciding that a judge's refusal to recuse himself should be re-
viewable even following a defendant's unconditional guilty plea does
not end the inquiry. Not every violation of § 455(a) should result in the
defendant being released without a new trial." Some courts have held
that an improper denial of a § 455(a) motion should be remedied by
vacating the judgment even though the defendant has suffered no ac-
tual prejudice." But the proper remedy in the context of guilty pleas is
to allow the defendant to withdraw his plea,"s and require that, upon
rehearing, the case be heard by another judge. This remedy would
further the goal of § 455 by ensuring restored public confidence in the
ability of the judicial system to right public wrongs. It would further
the goals behind Rule 11 as well by ensuring that defendants are af-
forded the ability to have a determination made of their guilt by a
judge that is not only impartial, but appears to be so.
To the objection that allowing these appeals will open the
floodgates for defendants seeking to overturn their convictions, a
plausible response exists. Four limitations exist on the operation of
both § 455 and Rule 11." The first and most obvious is the harmless
error rule, which would filter out those cases where the error has not
had an outcome-determining effect on the plea negotiations.38 Second,
233. The defendant, with the assistance of his counsel, can make a cost-benefit analysis of
the likelihood of receiving a better or worse sentence on rehearing. At least sometimes the
defendant would be happy with his sentence, and no further appeal would be necessary.
234. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 862 (1988).
235. See id. at 868; Preston v. United States, 923 F.2d 731, 735 (9th Cir. 1991); Potashnick v.
Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1111-12 (5th Cir. 1980).
236. This is exactly the remedy supplied in Rule 11 for a conditional guilty plea. See FED. R.
CRIM. P. 11(a)(2).
237. See generally discussion supra Parts H.D. and III.B.
238. See supra notes 93-95, 119 and accompanying text.
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the fact that a defendant's remedy is limited to withdrawing his plea
may also serve to deter those who would assert frivolous claims, be-
cause the government would be free to retry them or renegotiate an-
other plea under a different judge. Third, timeliness, although not a
universal limitation, may still serve to exclude some defendants who
sleep on their rights."9 Fourth, the extrajudicial source doctrine, alive
and well since Liteky, is also an important limitation"0 Defendants
must still find the underlying bases for the challenge somewhere be-
sides the judicial proceedings themselves.
Explicit waiver is not foreclosed by this argument, either. An
explicit waiver would be a statement in the plea agreement that lays
out the full factual basis for the recusal and specifically waives appeal
of the denied recusal motion. Should the parties choose to waive their
right to recuse the judge clearly and explicitly after a full disclosure on
the record, they are certainly free to do so. 4' An unconditional guilty
plea, however, should not be presumed to be such a waiver.
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts should reinterpret § 455(a) in the context of Rule 11 so
as to further the goals of both when they intersect in a given case.
This would ensure that criminal defendants are afforded the protec-
tions of Rule 11, and these protections are guarded by a judge whose
impartiality cannot reasonably be questioned. If this cannot be effec-
tuated by judicial interpretation, Congress should step in and clarify
its intent to require judges to step down when § 455(a) requires them
to do so, regardless of whether or not a criminal defendant subse-
quently pleads guilty to the charge.
The purpose behind 28 U.S.C. § 455 is frustrated if courts
refuse to allow defendants who have entered unconditional guilty
pleas to appeal a previous denial of a recusal motion on the basis that
they waived their challenge. The only way to ensure that Congress's
goal of ensuring public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the federal judiciary is if courts recognize that an unconditional guilty
239. See generally discussion supra Part II.D.2.
240. See generally discussion supra Part II.D.3.
241. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(e) (1994). Concerns regarding possible coercive tactics for obtaining
an explicit waiver also exist. Explicit waivers, however, have an automatic check to determine
their voluntariness on appeal, if needed. An explicit waiver can be appealed directly on its own
merits. A guilty plea, however, must be attacked on the voluntariness of the entire plea, not on
just any discrete waiver contained therein. See generally discussion supra Part II.B.5.
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plea is not a clear waiver of the right to have a judge that is not only
impartial, but appears to be so.
Nancy B. Pridgen"
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